The long history of Balkan region demonstrates, especially in the aspects of state-and societybuilding, the enormous diversity of problems. According to many analyses these countries now are reflecting a lot of dilemmas which in fact, every society or sub-region faces on its way to full membership of the EU. The final goal of the Western Balkan countries is to transform their economies into viable market economies and to achieve integration into the European Union. This paper explores the efficiency of the transition process in the Western Balkans.
Introduction
The Western Balkans emerged from wars two decades ago and has since seen bouts of instability. The region's countries need the 'EU anchor'. The EU has played a positive role in the Balkans. The EU has given the people of the Western Balkans hope. But over the last few years, strategic planning for the future of the region has relied on the assumption that it is moving slowly but surely towards EU membership. EU accepted these countries as candidates in principle at the EU-Balkans summit in Thessaloniki in 2003. Since then the EU has shown increasing signs of 'enlargement fatigue'. At another EU-Balkans meeting in Salzburg in March 2006, the EU reiterated its pledge of keeping the door open.
The biggest challenge in the Balkans is that if economic disaster strikes, they can all but do little to prevent the economic shocks, spilling into social unrest, being used instrumentally for political unrest, extremist or populist political projects, or inciting interethnic tensions. Lastly the World Bank has declared that after the double-dip recession, as a group the six South East European countries (SEE6)--Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia--are now making a fragile recovery. But still EU candidate countries must prove their respect for democracy and the rule of law to be eligible for EU membership. This paper examines how this criteria's will be fulfilled by these countries, and especially we will examine the case of Albania. How can it be possible to shorten this long transition in the region that more over is causing fatigue and disappointment?
The EU integration process is a tool for strengthening and accelerating the transition process, as these processes are mutually reinforcing. The final goal of the Western Balkan countries is to transform their economies into viable market economies and to achieve integration into the European Union. EU accession is seen as crucial to a successful domestic transformation. Further progress with the EU accession process is of great importance for the continuation of institutional reforms and establishment of a functioning market economy across the Western Balkans (Penev 2012: 94-122) .
Enlargements belong to the milestones in the history of the European Union (Glüpker 2013: 223-241) . In 1993, the European leaders established the Copenhagen criteria stating that 'Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European Council 1993: 1) . Enlargement is very often defined as the EU's most powerful policy (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 4).
In general, aggravating circumstances of transition for most Western Balkan countries were political instability and war conflicts, which had a significant impact on the usual dynamics of the transition from planned to market economy, in a way of slowing it down (Škuflić 2010) . This paper explores the efficiency of the transition process in the Western Balkans, and after the introduction it will give a theoretical review of transition.
Western Balkan Panorama
Despite increased investments in the region and rapid economic growth Western Balkan countries have only 21% (Albania) and 52% (Croatia) of the average European Union Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, indicating the need for faster implementation of reforms and individual involvement of countries into the process of European integration. There is a significant development gap between Western Balkan countries.
Taking into account their economic target, which is EU accession, these countries, except of Croatia, have not achieved a satisfactory results in the area of economy (Ibid). The GDP per capita in relation to the European average separates Croatia from other countries of the region with GDP per capita reaching 52% of the European average. In 2008, Croatia reached 63% of EU-27 GDP per capita which is three times more than other countries. Namely, in 2006 Albania had the lowest position, with 21% of the European average, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 26% of the European average, FYR Macedonia had 28%, and Serbia and Montenegro had 33% of the European average. Western Balkan countries do not have a significant potential for attracting foreign investors.
Most Balkan states are still weak (albeit with strong national identities), separated by soft and porous borders, haunted by the legacy of war, soaked in the communist culture of political connections, and composed of dysfunctional institutions (especially judiciaries), inexperienced administrations, feeble civil societies and a high degree of external dependency. All of these (unflattering) traits help to perpetuate rather than eliminate corrupt practices, and to prevent instead of foster democratic scrutiny and prosecution.
Despite all EU measures in favour of the SEE-5, there is still today a great deal of uncertainty as to when and how (even whether) the SEE-5 could join the EU. A clear strategy for integrating the Western Balkans into the EU still seems to be missing. One of the key elements which is going to influence future developments in EU-SEE relations is the forthcoming enlargement of the EU (Uvalic 2003) .
Yet the EU is using normative claims, as they are practiced and understood by Western states, in its effort not just to convince the people in the region of the rightfulness of the criteria, but also as a means to interfere more legitimately in the internal affairs of local governments, as the administrator, the arbiter, and the bearer of moral values (Anastasakis 2008: 365-377) .
The second agenda aims at convergence and political transformation from a functional and practical perspective, through the adoption of rules and procedures and/or the creation of institutions and public administrations that are capable of more effectively addressing the local political concerns and the externally imposed acquis communautaire (Ibid). Beyond the 'appropriate' and the 'normal', the functional agenda refers to the 'sustainable' and the 'viable' for the countries in question, with the aim of suppressing clientelistic, particularistic, dysfunctional mentalities, practices, and rules. The logic of functionality seeks to address the weak state structures and institutions that resulted from the post-communist transition, the ethnic wars, the intrusive and heavy-handed external interference and the lack of capacity and experience of the new independent states, successors of former Yugoslavia.
State weakness has become the main challenge of the region and refers to the lack of the rule of law, flourishing organized crime and corruption, and illegitimate and nonrepresentative institutions (UNDP 2002).
The region still weak
Most of the Western Balkan states are weak states (albeit with strong national identities), separated by soft (for informal activities) borders, with inexperienced administrations and a high degree of external dependency (Krastev 2002: 39-53) . The functional agenda of political conditionality is more evident on state building and institution-building aiming to create institutions and structures that should be sustainable and practical, and can produce more efficient outcomes.
Such divisions became more apparent before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania through the use of 'safeguard clauses'13 and more obvious in the face of future enlargements, reflected in the debates of 'absorption capacity' and 'enlargement fatigue' (Anastasakis2008).
At a time when the enlargement process is struggling to be effective, it is crucial to reassess the state of EU-Balkan relations. After Croatia's accession in 2013, there is a concrete risk that the pace of accession will slow down, especially if relations between Serbia and Kosovo continue to be tense. And if the pace does decelerate, overshadowed by the economic and political crises within the European Union, Europe might 'lose' the Balkans once more to nationalism, violence and further breakdowns of agreed states and borders, or it might lose its leverage to other actors who may not share similar views and values with the EU ( Balfour, 2011) . Also, if the enlargement strategy is to be effective it cannot easily retreat from the principles and conditions it has previously posed.
The balance to be reached does not just depend on the rigour with which conditionality is applied: the problem also lies in its credibility. The conditions for joining the EU have changed over the years, reflecting internal developments, such as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as growing uneasiness in the EU about enlargement and its potential consequences. This has led to speculation in the region that democratic conditionality is being used as an excuse to keep the Balkan countries at arms' length (Ibid).
Rule of law alone cannot compensate for a limited scope of constitutional freedom to create effective democracy and it is clear from Table 1 that it is more difficult for a country to obtain a high score in terms of effective democracy than constitutional freedom. As Table 1 shows, formal rules and procedures for democracy are more or less in place in the Balkans, and the forerunners are, as expected, more advanced in the EU integration process than the laggards. Thus, Croatia stands out with a 74.25% EDI score, which reveals that most democratic rights are guaranteed by the rule of law. Montenegro and FYR Macedonia are behind this number with EDI scores just shy of 40%, suggesting that many democratic rights are still largely ignored. Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina emerge as the most problematic cases, mainly due to their low RLI scores, which reflect poor implementation of existing democratic rights. Somewhat surprising is the result for Serbia, which attains only 28.8% on the EDI, despite making significant progress in recent years under a liberal-reformist government. However, the scores are for 2009 (as these were the most recent common estimates of the two datasets) and so, to a certain extent, they have been outdated by recent events and developments. Nevertheless, the data sufficiently indicates that apart from Croatia, all of the countries in the region exhibit a clear gap between formal and effective democracy, whereby existing democratic rules are not properly implemented in practice. This approach underlines the disparity between the formal/procedural/institutional aspects of democracy and their actual enforcement. The result also suggests that governments and international organizations such as the EU must adopt a differentiated strategy in order to ensure the continuation of democratization in the region. This strategy must concomitantly deal with both formal and substantive criteria of democracy in assessing the success or failure of pushing forward a democratic agenda (Balfour & Stratulat 2011) . The Balkan countries are usually placed precisely among those cases in which corruption is the norm rather than the exception. Several broad observations about the region prompt this claim, including inter alia the presence of the same individuals in influential positions regardless of the outcome of elections, high political migration from opposition to governmental parties, mediated access to almost every resource by oligarchic networks, widespread popular perceptions that politicians are above the law and that high-level corruption outlives changes in government, as well as failure to take legal action against even the most notoriously corrupt members of the status groups.
According to the most recent 2010 Global Corruption Barometer31 by Transparency International, almost six out of 10 people say that corruption levels have increased in their country over the past three years. This perception is prevalent among 73% of respondents in the EU 27 and 57% of those surveyed in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Worldwide, one in four people claim to have paid a bribe during the last year, and 18% of the interviewees in the Western Balkans and Turkey -compared to only 7% in 2006 -consider that the incidence of bribery has risen domestically. Similarly, the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index32 by Transparency International shows that nearly three quarters of the 178 countries studiedincluding all the Balkan states -score below the five-point level on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). These findings clearly indicate that corruption is a serious problem throughout the world, as well as in the Balkan region. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in more than 170 countries. The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that the average index score for the Western Balkans was 3.5, on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), and they placed 81st among 182 countries surveyed. Regional scores varied from 3.1 in Albania to 4.0 in Montenegro (Table 2 ). These results indicate that corruption remains one of the major weaknesses of the legal environment and must be tackled urgently.
However, the current economic crisis which started in 2008 has led to a shift in focus away from the social problems that faced the EU and its member states in the immediate wake of the enlargements (Zahn 2013) .
The hope of the EU is that, by combining economic and social welfare, the EU will achieve 'stronger, lasting growth and the creation of more and better jobs' (Commission Communication 2005). The consolidation of the economic recovery that began in 2010 resulted in moderate positive growth in all countries of the region. The highest growth rate was recorded in Kosovo (3.9%) and in Albania (3.3%), followed by Montenegro (2.5%) and FYR Macedonia (1.9%), while Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina recorded minimal growth rates. While some recovery seemed evident in the first half of 2011, economic activity weakened in the second half of the year and the first half of 2012. In spite of the weakening of the economic activity in the second part of 2011, all countries of the region registered positive economic growth in 2011, varying from 1.6% in Serbia to 5.0% in Kosovo i . The short-term economic prospects for the Western Balkan region remain weak and vulnerabilities have increased as a result of the euro zone crisis (EBRD Transition Report 2013). Financial sector vulnerabilities are a particular concern, given that the vast majority of the banking system is foreign owned and that most countries rely on funding from abroad. In some countries, these banks also hold significant amounts of local treasury bills (EBRD 2012) .
According to the Doing Business 2012 ranking list, FYR Macedonia was the best-ranked country in the region, as it improved its ranking position from 38th in 2011 to 22nd in 2012, mostly due to the successful implementation of extensive regulatory reform in the previous period. In Doing Business 2013 ranking list FYR Macedonia was ranked 23rd, dropping one spot compared to the previous year. FYR Macedonia was followed by Montenegro, which improved its rank from 66th in 2011 to 56th in 2012 and to 51st in 2013 due to intensive reforms in several reform areas (World Bank Report, 2009 . However, the recovery in SEE6 is still tentative. In some countries nonperforming loans, sluggish credit recovery, continued deleveraging, and fiscal consolidation are exerting a dragand recovery in SEE6 is unlikely to accelerate as long as the Euro zone remains in recession (World Bank, Report No. 78505; .
Against the backdrop of this tentative and fragile recovery, SEE6 countries should, as argued in the last report, intensify their efforts to reform structural areas. Fiscal consolidation efforts should become easier now that the output and revenue outlook is improving. The investment climate needs to be improved substantially, especially in the main areas of weaknesses: construction permits and licenses, barriers to entrepreneurship, and skills and infrastructure (Ibid).
Secondly World Bank, one of the main worries in this nascent recovery is that SEE6 economies are plagued by high unemployment, especially youth unemployment, and they are not creating jobs fast enough to absorb new entrants into the labor force. In fact, the jobs situation is worse than the dismal unemployment figures suggest because so many leave the region to work elsewhere. In part, this is the legacy of periods when some SEE6 countries suffered significantly from regional dislocations that delayed reforms. An estimated 33 percent of people in SEE6 live in poverty-and 8 percent live in extreme poverty. Simple projections for 2011-15 suggest that while in general poverty will decrease slowly in both the EU11 and SEE6 countries, extreme poverty will decline to 5 percent in the SEE6 and to 1 percent in the EU11. Large-scale privatization, reforms that make it easier to close a business, and governance and enterprise restructuring are positively and significantly correlated with employment growth. In other words, other things being equal, the deeper the reforms in any of these three areas, the more jobs are created. Employment growth is also positively correlated with several governance indicators, including more control of corruption, better quality regulation, more effective government, and higher levels of voice and accountability (World Bank, Richter, 2013) . SEE6 countries may have been just starting to benefit from their push toward reforms and restructuring but had not yet had a chance to reap the benefits of the reforms when the global crisis hit (Ibid). Internal and international mobility can foster growth and job creation by opening up opportunities to aggregate economic activities and to better match jobs and workers (World Bank 2012b). Internal mobility can also be a force for structural transformation, both in terms of the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services, and by fostering links between leading and lagging areas through remittances or local investments. International and national mobility are linked; for example, recent evidence from Albania suggests that international migrants might be providing the resources and encouragement for those left behind to move to more prosperous areas (Sorensen, Engberg, Pedersen, Report for IOM, 2002). Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYR Macedonia are among the top emigration countries in the world, with Albania in the top 10 (World Bank 2011). Migratory flows differ across SEE6 countries. More than half the migrants from Albania and Serbia were low-skilled (against one-third for the region as a whole, OECD 2012), 31 while 29 percent of migrants from FYR Macedonia and 24 percent of those from Bosnia and Herzegovina had tertiary education (World Bank 2011).
Apart from judicial and administrative reforms, a key condition for Albania to obtain an EC recommendation for being granted candidate country status (in response to its EU membership application submitted in 2009) will be the implementation of democratic principles (Żornaczuk 2013: 1-2) .
The challenges of the region
Regional reconciliation and good neighborly relations have been identified as a key challenge in the region. The third area underlined in Commission's enlargement strategy was strengthening the economies of aspirant states (European Commission, Enlargament Strategy, 2012 . The progress reports reveal that the Western Balkan states' performance in meeting the EU criteria has been uneven. The balance sheet of Croatia, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo has been overall positive: Croatia which joined the 27-member block in July 2013. Montenegro which has officially started its accession talks in June 2012 in accordance with the Commission's new approach prioritizing the judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security issues needs to step up its efforts in establishing a strong track record in the fight against corruption and organized crime. Albania's politicians have managed to reach an agreement to overcome the deadlock in the parliament paving the way for undertaking the key reforms to fulfill most of the 12 priorities (Ibid).
Despite the current debate about the enlargement fatigue and the effects of the sovereign debt crisis coupled with the claims that the EU is losing its power of attraction, the enlargement policy is still a driver for change in the Western Balkans.
Albania, the battle for the status
The Commission has acknowledged that Tirana has fulfilled the priorities on ensuring the proper functioning of the parliament, adoption of the laws requiring reinforced majority; has made good progress in meeting the priorities on the reform of public administration and improving the treatment of detainees and has taken steps to fulfill the priorities regarding the law on administrative courts, lifting of immunities of high-level public officials and judges, increase of seizures of criminal assets, adoption of a strategy on property reform and amendments to the criminal code strengthening sanctions for domestic violence. In line with the progress, the Commission recommended granting Albania the status of a candidate country provided that the remaining priorities regarding the judicial and public administration reform as well as the revision of parliamentary rules of procedures are met. Despite receiving green light to be granted candidate status from the Commission, Tirana needs to step up its efforts in the fight against organized crime and corruption, enhancing the independence and efficiency of judicial institutions and holding of elections in accordance with international standards.
The transition has proven difficulties as successive governments have tried to deal with high unemployment, widespread, corruption and a dilapidated infrastructure (Shtupi and Vasjari 2013: 20-32 The principle of democracy is a challenge for these countries, but the parliaments and parliamentary bodies are still characterized by the slow step of reform. General and local elections in the countries of Western Balkans were considered basically free but the participation of voters was generally low because the behavior of many political leaders leaves much to be desired (Ibid). Shtupi explain that the public administration is under reconstruction reform and these countries have difficulties to reinforce their administrative and judicial capacity. In the sector of the justice and home affairs we see a progress in these countries with the reform in their judicial systems a key factor for the rule of law. Organized crime and corruption affect negatively the institutional and the economic progress in these countries Albania has made limited progress to meet the Political Criteria.
Regarding the restitution of or compensation for land expropriated during the communist era, the parliament of Albania approved an act of law which was the object of criticism for the past big land owners in Albania, and has not been sufficient to respond to the constitutional requirements. The progress in the Reform of State Institutions is going slowly, argue Shtupi and Vasjari. The implementation of rule of law remains deficient, notably due to weak law enforcement institutions, limited administrative capacity (Report from the Commission 2002: 26). The fight against organized crime, illegal trafficking and corruption is a priority of Albanian government.
Albanian law guarantees the individual freedoms and the human rights (Report from the Commission 2001: 6).
All these problems, which confront the Albania, must be fulfilled within the political criteria and the implication is that the European Union makes the pressures in the fields that Albania must work much more. We have the pressure of European Union in the reform progress because was insufficient and particularly in areas that are vital for Albanian's future and its successful integration.
The Dutch parliament adopted in12 December 2013 a decision which obliged the government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte to reject the European Commission proposal to give Albania EU candidate status.
The Hague also opposes opening the doors to Schengen membership to Bulgaria and Romania, in spite of the fact that the Commission considers that the two countries have met all conditions to accede to the borderless EU space.
After two rejections in 2010 and 2011, the commission first offered Albania its tentative approval in 2012, but hedged around with conditions. The brief euphoria that Albanians enjoyed, coinciding with a century of nationhood, quickly subsided into resignation. The commission's 2013 Progress report found that Albania had made good progress on key reforms. In the European Parliament last week, Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle told MEPs: "I am impressed by the way the new government is prioritising its efforts in the fight against corruption and organised crime, and I am equally impressed by the results achieved in the months since it has taken office, which confirm the positive trend established earlier.
"Granting candidate status is an important step, not only for encouraging Albania to pursue the far reaching reforms required, but also for the credibility of the EU," he warned. "Albania has delivered and so should we" (Füle, 2013) .
But one cannot help wondering whether, given the current hysteria in some member states about the opening of borders to Romanians and Bulgarians in January, some leaders have not decided that they cannot face the domestic outcry that might follow approval of Albania's candidate status, and are willing to sacrifice a small population (an experience Albanians are well used to, throughout history), for the sake of national expediency (Holman 2013) .
Once again, the European Union has not granted to Albania the candidate status to become a member of this organism of the old continent.
The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Fule, announced the decision of the 28 EU member countries: "Evident progress and intensive efforts of the new government, but a clear perspective on the status in June 2014"(Progress Report, 2013).
The refusal came as a result of the fact that at least 5 member countries were against granting Albania the candidate status. Amongst them, Holland, Denmark, Germany, France and Great Britain.
"The Council welcomes further action in the fight against corruption and organized crime and the engagement of the new government to intensify efforts in this domain. The Council hopes to take a decision in relation to the EU candidate status for Albania in June 2014, depending on the approval of the European Council, upon the condition that Albania should continue with the encouraging progress made so far", states the text proposed by the 5 member countries which have the biggest influence in the European Union.
The letter demands to the European Commission to prepare another report on Albania, although the last report made it clear that Albania had fulfilled EU requisites for the status (Independent Balkan News Agency 2014).
Probable membership talks hinge on Albania's work against corruption and organized crime, strengthening the judiciary, reforming the administration and protecting basic freedoms and rights, including those of the Roma community (European Stability Initiative (2014).
The key priorities for 2014 are the following (EBRD, 2013): • Fiscal adjustment is needed. The budget deficit more than doubled in the first half of 2013. Measures to stem the rise of public debt, including the restoration of a fiscal anchor, should be implemented next year.
• Privatization needs to continue. The subdued economic performance has continued into 2013, and GDP grew by 1.7 per cent in the first quarter. This weak growth performance reflects the extent of difficulties in the euro zone, particularly in periphery countries that are Albania's major economic partners. Cross border parent bank deleveraging has been significant.
Inflation has moderated and, thanks in part to the Bank of Albania's (the central bank) successful inflation targeting framework, remains under control. In January 2012 inflation fell below the target range of 2 4 per cent. With concerns mounting over weakening economic growth, the central bank began a series of cuts in the base interest rate this year, with the latest -in July 2013 -bringing down the interest rate to a historical low of 3.5 per cent. Inflation declined to 1.6 per cent year on year in July 2013.
The fiscal deficit rose substantially due mainly to a pre election spending hike. The reported deficit more than doubled in the first half of 2013, rising to 3.4 per cent of the projected 2013 GDP (from 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2012). In 2012 public debt reached the statutory limit of 60 per cent of GDP, and legislation was passed in 2013 to remove this limit to accommodate a further expected rise in public debt. The hike in the deficit will contribute to a further rise in public debt. The International Monetary Fund has urged the government to reinstate a fiscal anchor and thus commit to bringing down public debt to a more sustainable level. In the meantime, the government has introduced a set of expenditure related restrictions to prevent a further rise in the deficit this year.
The outlook for 2013 remains clouded by the economic difficulties in the euro zone. Moreover, the downside risks are high, as macroeconomic imbalances persist and the financial sector continues to be exposed to both domestic and external risks, while the macroeconomic policy buffers have been exhausted. Over the medium term Albania could benefit considerably from a global recovery if it is to be able to make further progress on much needed structural reforms.
Limited progress has been made in improvements to the business environment over the past year. Only a few notable improvements have been made since a big push on reforms was made between 2009 and 2010, when the regulatory requirements for starting a business were reduced considerably (EBRD Transition Report 2013). As a result, Albania continues to rank below most regional peers on the indicators of the quality of its business environment. In the World Bank 2014 Doing Business report, Albania's ranking improved on just one indicator, while remaining constant or declining on all others. Its overall standing relative to other countries declined by eight positions, to ninetieth of 189 countries. The country continues to perform most poorly in dealing with construction permits, paying taxes, getting electricity and registering property. In the latest World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index, Albania ranked ninety fifth of 148 countries. The report points to considerable underperformance with regard to property rights and judicial independence. Corruption is another major deterrent for new investment. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Albania ranked one hundred and thirteenth of 176 countries, and below all other SEE countries.
Even though the legislative and institutional framework provides a good basis for development of an effective public procurement system in line with EU rules, the legislative framework on public procurement and concessions is not fully in line with the acquis (IPA Country Report, 2013) . Effort is required with regard to strengthening the institutional framework and clearly defining and delimiting the competencies of all public procurement institutions in order to avoid the overlapping of tasks and to remove the remaining loopholes in the system. No comprehensive system of administrative monitoring and control of the application of public procurement rules and contracts have been introduced so far (EU Analytical report 2010 and Progress report 2011).
The grey economy in Albania considerably harms its development: "Albania has an informal, and unreported, sector that may be as large as 50% of official GDP (Institute for Regional and International Studies 2010).
Albania needs to make further progress, in particular regarding the rule of law and the fight against corruption and organized crime. The independence of state institutions, and in particular the judiciary, needs further strengthening (European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report).
European Commission stressed that Albania has made progress in aligning its legislation, policies and capacity with European standards. It now needs to enhance its efforts in the implementation of these laws and policies.
Albania, between the criteria's and the reality
Albania has not yet acquired the status of candidate country, but has already acquired the status of NATO member countries. This can be seen as a clear sign that external interests and events affect a process that should be internal to the club of countries that gamble and work for unity (Ancona and Patimo 2010: 1-16) .
Albania is obviously one of the most unique cases in Eastern Europe not only for its size and location but also for its legacy in the economic development and many other peculiarities as well. Without denying similarities with other ex-communist countries, Albania has pursued its way of economic transformation toward a market economy (Muco 1997: 1-83) .
Muco argues that the corruption and other new and old mentalities represent a serious barrier that, given the circumstances, has to be removed gradually together with the implementation of institutional and legal system transformation.
Moreover, the Member States are less optimistic in their assessments regarding the progress of reforms in Albania, especially about the fight against corruption, where apart from adoption of laws, political will and concrete results are required. It should be noted that in drafting the annual Progress Reports, the Commission takes into consideration the opinions and concerns of the Member States regarding that country, in order to avoid objections or outright refusal of its recommendation during discussions in the Council.
The EU is faced with the dilemma of pushing forward the integration process with countries in the region, so that these countries do not feel left aside, which in turn will slow down the pace of reforms (European Movement in Albania, 2012:1-4) In the words of the Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle: "it is really important that there is no reform fatigue".
Presenting the annual Enlargement Package, Commissioner Štefan Füle said: 'Enlargement is a process in the making and despite the economic crisis it is a good policy -it constitutes part of the solution. Enlargement continues to be one of the most effective EU policies. By addressing 'fundamentals' first -such as the fight against corruption, sound economic governance, freedom of expression and media, human rights and protection of minorities -it strengthens political and economic stability in the aspiring countries and the EU as a whole. '' In the annual reports, the European Commission recommends granting EU candidate status to Albania and, for the fifth time in a row, the opening of accession negotiations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
According to many analyzes EU governments say strengthening the rule of law and combating organized crime and corruption remain "urgent challenges" for Albania. The EU and Albania concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), seen as the first step towards membership, in June 2006. The negotiations took three-and-a-half years -three times longer than they took in Croatia's and FYR Macedonia's case. This is because the EU thought Albania was moving too slowly in the fight against corruption and organised crime. The EU also has doubts about Albania's energy sector, which suffers from unstable supplies.
The Gross Domestic Product ( Albania's economy will grow more slowly than planned in 2013 and its public debt will rise further above the country's self-imposed ceiling, according to Finance Ministry forecasts. It forecast the economy would grow 3.1 percent this year -more slowly than an earlier 4 per cent forecast -and public debt would rise to 63.8 from 62.6 percent. Albania's economic freedom score is 65.2, making its economy the 58th freest in the 2013 Index. Its overall score has increased by 0.1 point, with declines in property rights and labor freedom offset by improvements in business freedom and the management of public finance. Albania is ranked 27th among the 43 countries in the Europe region, and its overall score is above the world average. Albania's economy has benefitted substantially from a decade of increased openness and flexibility and weathered the immediate impact of the global economic crisis relatively well. Over the past two years, however, economic dynamism has slowed (Albania Foreign Trade Export Import Tirana Business ALB 2013). Expansionary public spending that the government hoped would mitigate some of the pain of necessary adjustments has resulted in budget deficits and rising public debt, now near 60 percent of GDP.
Although the state continues to control key enterprises, particularly in the energy sector, the economy is mostly in private hands. Beneficial structural reforms have included bank privatization, implementation of competitive flat tax rates, and modernization of the regulatory environment. Deeper institutional reforms to reduce labor market regulations and increase the efficiency of the judiciary, which remains subject to political interference, are critical to further success. Corruption continues to undermine the prospects for long-term economic development (Ibid).
The macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks seem rather optimistic and macroeconomic projections are not supplemented with alternative scenarios in the light of uncertainty. Almost all the relevant data are covered in accordance with the EFP methodology but weaknesses persist, especially with regard to labour market and wage statistics. Links between the macroeconomic scenario and structural reforms are not explicit enough. The framework for structural reforms is not coherent and comprehensive and lacks clear timeframes and budgetary paths for implementation. The capacity for economic policy coordination and implementation remains insufficient (European Commission, Albania 2013 Progress Report, 2013 .
In this context, Janusz Bugajski argue that the region can descend into a gray zone where splutters of progress in pursuit of reform are followed by prolonged periods of stagnation or even reversal. Such conditions provide fertile terrain for varieties of political and national radicalism. Although these are unlikely to generate outright war, they can create pockets of insecurity, conflict, and violence that would disqualify several states from EU membership. Such exclusion would in turn prolong and exacerbate local disputes in a vicious spiral of failure and place enormous strain on international actors seeking to mediate or to ensure progress (Bugajski 2013) .
The question that remains for Liljana Siljanovska is: Should the Balkan be place where the credibility of European Union will happen? This question is becoming increasingly evident after the rejection of the EU constitution by France and the Netherlands in the middle of 2005 which is mostly resulted by dissatisfaction of voters of the internal political governing in their countries. And remain still today with the reaction of Netherland and Brittany about the candidate status of Albania. This conclusion was further created by created mediumistic reality for Euro integrated processes of the aspirant and candidate countries for their membership through one longer period of creation of public opinion, mostly intensive from 2003 -2005 (Siljanovska 2013 .
What is important for EU is social economic reality of Balkan countries. Their economic development is very low or doesn't exist at all. There is high unemployment, about 40% and the most existing problem is corruption. The law democracy of governmental institutions causes the law confidence of population in achieving their rights in the frame of existing regulations and practicing of national institutions. Parallel with internationalization of criminal networks, the criminalization of politics takes place on the Balkans (Ibid).
Analyze of economic situation in the West Balkans countries shows low level of gross domestic product which is result of low level of direct foreign investment and bad management of domestic production capacities accompanied with non standardization of quality, assortment and ranking of Balkans products according rules and standards of international market. All this contributes to unemployment, poverty, large class differences and reduced social mobility. The democratization of political governing with establishing of multi parties and pluralism of interests, functioning of parliamentary democracy and forming and activity of political parties, citizen associations and introduction of functioning rules of legal country, are new values in period of transition of political surrounding of West Balkans Countries. They are based on universal principles for democratic rights and freedoms, right of free expression of citizens, democratic forms of political decision and governing of law in system institutions. As a result of that, those countries like, Albania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, Monte Negro and Bosnia and Herzegovina face with insufficiently implemented forms, means and modalities of practicing the proclaimed European values in development of political system of deciding and governing with institutions in implementation of legislative, court and executive power. Conflicts of value systems in these Balkans countries appear because of non-complimentary between the new democratic-liberal and traditional centralized values. In development of social-political relations in the Balkans countries the conflict of value systems is expressed through issue of nondemocratic forms of governing of the law, politicization of all objects of social life, bribery, corruption, protection of personal and party interests instead the interests of the citizens, that is, the voters, through distrust towards institutions of the systems, issue of conflict situations, violence and insecurity of the citizens. Economic, political and cultural dubious in social processes and changes of WestBalkan countries in forming the post communist values in transition period, have been reflected on the social sphere.
Analysis shows that the transition process depends on reform background, starting positions, the circumstances in which the transition takes place and the willingness of the nation to face inevitable problems imposed by the elements of market economy (Škuflić 2010) .
It is true that despite the fatigue caused by a long transition, the European Union still remains a final road for Balkan countries because all argue that it represents freedom of movement, and the "European values" such as cultural diversity, peace and freedom of opinion.
In this context the question is whether young people in the Balkans feel as if they are a part of Europe. According to many data, the position of youth as actors in the integration processes in the Western Balkans is not valuated or underestimated. In many surveys we can see a vain interest and poor knowledge of young people about the EU project. This is real especially about their own rights and possibilities as future EU citizens. An optimistic overview shows that young people from the Western Balkans tend to share a positive image of the European Union (EU) and its future.
The Albanian youth opinion about the integration process
Many analyses shows us that despite all problems that are still present, the majority of young people from the Albania, and Western Balkans too, think that the EU membership would contribute to the democratic consolidation in the region, as well as to the necessary reforms in all fields of economic, social and political areas.
The main results of the survey (2-11-2012) made in Albanian universities and high schools on the perceptions of young people on integration of European process, and the meaning and future of the EU, in front of the similar issues that are treated in whole region will be analyzed. It looks at the attitudes and perceptions of respondents aged 18 to 22 based on snowball sampling among young people in higher education.
In this survey we 2 found that only 11.7 % relate EU with the hope for a better economy alone, but 55% of Albanian Youth relate EU with free movement, Euro, better economy, better security all together. (Figure 1) 
Figure 1: Albanian young people's perception on EU
A vast majority of young people from the Western Balkans think that their countries should join the EU. We find that 84% of Albanian youth believe on the EU institutions, 14% of them do not believe (Figure 2 ).
Figure 2: Albanian youth confidence on EU institutions
Only one fifth of youth does not support EU membership of their country. When we asked them in which year their country will be a part of the European Union, we found a large scope between the most optimistic scenario and the most pessimistic scenario, going from the "next decade" to "never".
Generally, the majority of young people from the Western Balkans think that the fulfillment of the preconditions is going well, but not as well as it actually could. In some aspects it's doing well, in some not as well, such as corruption or reform of judicial system.
Asked if EU integration is a priority for Albanian politics, 89.3 confirm and only 8.6 think different (Figure 3 ). In the middle of 2009, the bleak landscape that confronts the EU and aspirant member states in the Western Balkans reveals the extent to which 'enlargement fatigue' and the Eurozone crisis have permeated both individual mind-sets and the institutional negotiating space. (O' Brennan 2013: 43) . The EU's deep economic crisis and exhaustive introspection has had a pronouncedly detrimental impact on the progress of enlargement-related reform in the Western Balkans (Ibid 37). If 'enlargement fatigue' constitutes the most significant challenge to the EU, 'accession fatigue' (or what others refer to as 'adjustment fatigue' or 'evaluation fatigue') constitutes its concomitant malady in the Western Balkans. According to O' Brennan, the two phenomena have a symbiotic relationship because the economic crisis has also fundamentally challenged some of the key assumptions about 'EU normative power', and this in turn has changed the dynamics of the previously successful 'external incentives' model. 'For the Western Balkans the experience of Greece resonates deeply" (Panagiotou 2013: 97) .
Despite all these problems that increased the skepticism in the region in 2009, according to the IIS (2010), the majority of young people from the Albania, and Western Balkans too, think that the EU membership would contribute to the democratic consolidation in the region, as well as to the necessary reforms in all fields of economic, social and political areas.
Since the first measuring of perceptions and thinking on EU integration in 2003, Albanians support for the EU has never reached below 80% levels, a level of support which has never been achieved in any of the member states or non, of the EU. In 2009, a relative decrease in support was observed (From 95% in 2008 (From 95% in , to 88,7% in 2009 which was thought to signify the start of some sort of skepticism in the Albanian society regarding the European integration process, an accompanying trend throughout the whole history of the EU. Furthermore, it was hoped that this decrease would be a warning for a clear understanding of the process and the reforms, changes and factors which prepare a country for membership in the European Union (Albanian Institute for International Studies 2012).
Asked about the beneficiaries of EU integration, 65.3% of the Albanian youth think that it is important for the future of the region, 29.5 % evaluated the stabilization of the region and 5.2 % think that there is no value. From the perspective of necessity of the modernization of society, or rather, the emancipation of Albanian society "voting against membership" could be useful and necessary in mainly two aspects: Firstly, because it could encourage a debate related to European Integration, and secondly, on the more broader perspective of society, it could represent the beginnings for the nurturing of a sense of critical thinking in the Albanian society (Ibid).
We ask on what you believe more; in nation or in the EU structure. And we find that 46% of the Albanian youth believe more in nation, in front of the 51.2 % that believe in EU structure. However, the above mentioned assumptions were proved wrong after only one year. Survey result in 2010 showed more or less the same support, 93.4%, as in previous years of high support (2006, 2007, and 2008) . In 2011, votes for the membership of Albania in the EU seemed to reach the lowest point in the last 10 years, but it is still a popular vote, 80.7% and as we have said before, unmatched by any member state (or non) of the EU. This "low point" of support for Albanian's membership could not, under any circumstances, be explained by any kind of skepticism for the usefulness and possibility of Albania's membership to the EU, and even less so, represent the beginning of an ideological opposition to the EU and integration process. The reason behind the fall of support to 80.7 % was then argued, and rightfully so, to be related to the removal of the visa regime with EU countries. It was hoped, that with the removal of the visa regime, support for the membership to the EU would be more "normal", meaning lower, and the fundamental argument, undisputable at the time, was that Albanians identified membership to the EU and the whole process of integration with the free movement opportunity and therefore support was popular.
It was hoped that a "normal" support, similar to that of other countries, could warn of a sense of critical thinking in the Albanian society, away from so high results of more than 90% which bring back memories of election results during the communist regime (Ibid). Such a trend, would also suggest a clear and proper understanding of the process of Albania's preparation for integration to the EU. However, the fall of support (2011) amidst the opportunity of Albanian citizens to move freely in Europe, was almost insignificant, or at least insufficient grounds upon which the above mentioned hypothesis of critical thinking and understanding of the process as a set of internal reforms which would transform society, politics, economy and the functioning of state and democracy could be built.
Finally we ask: Do you believe on EU and the answer was definitely clear there are not any respondent that does not believe at all on EU institutions but just 14.4% believe very much; at any case, 84 % of the Albanian youth still believe on EU. 
Conclusions
The Western Balkan states still have not fulfilled the necessary reforms and conditions set by the European Union for a possible membership. The difficulties and problems that these countries are facing within this process can be considered as twofold. On the one hand, in certain countries, the EU incentives structure needs to be reshaped for a more effective process. Problems and obstacles arise within the Western Balkan countries because of delays in the democratization process. The short-term economic prospects for the Western Balkans region remain weak and vulnerabilities have increased as a result of the Euro zone crisis. Minimizing the impact of the crisis on the European prospects of the Western Balkan countries at large by further encouraging the as yet fragile economic recovery and supporting economic growth is crucial. The EU needs a comprehensive strategy of integrating the Western Balkans into the European mainstream.
EU politicians need to understand how important a factor accession is in stabilising the Western Balkans. If that attraction fades, the progress made in the region over the last few years could be lost. It is therefore critically important that the EU stands by its commitment of Thessaloniki eventually to allow the Western Balkan countries to join. The people in the Western Balkans know that many difficult reforms will be necessary to prepare their countries for membership. The accession of the Western Balkans is a long-term prospect. There are various steps the EU could undertake in the meantime to help to sustain the reform momentum in the region. At the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003, EU leaders reassured their counterparts from the Western Balkans that they would "not regard the map of the Union as complete until you have joined us".
